The alarm authentication protocols include LAN manager version one into an anti alarm version one and
two.
These protocols are used to authenticate users and computers based on a challenge response mechanism
that proves to a server or domain controller that the user knows the password associated with an account.
Let's look at the different protocols and we will begin with Elm Hash.
Elm Hash is the oldest password storage that is used by windows.
This dates back to OS two in the 1980s, but due to the limited character set, it ultimately was fairly
easy to crack.
If l m hashes are still used in an environment, you can easily obtain the hashes from the SAM database
on Windows Systems or the in TDS database on a domain controller.
When Windows Vista and Server 28 was introduced, l m hashes were disabled, but of course they still
linger in the network.
If they are older systems, they still use it.
The next one we have is into Elm.
Into Elm is the way passwords are stored in modern Windows systems.
They can also be obtained by dumping the SAM database or using a hacking tool such as mini cats.
These hashes are also stored on domain controllers in the in Ted's file.
There is a well-known attack which is called Pass the hash into Elm is usually used with pass the hash
attacks.
Then we have no Elm version one.
This protocol uses the anti hash in a challenge response between the server and the client.
The version one of this protocol uses both the NT and Elm hash, depending on configuration and what
is available, but not Elm version two, which is the supposed new and improved version of Anti Elm,
makes it a little bit harder to crack.
Although it is still possible to crack it.
The concept of No Elm version two is the same as version one.
The only difference is the algorithm and the response is sent to the server.
Elm and not hashes are ways Windows stores passwords.
Both of these can be cracked to obtain the password, or they can be used for past the hash attacks.
Since then, TLM version one and two are challenge response protocols used for authentication in Windows
environments.
They can be used to recover the password by using a good brute force or dictionary attack and they can
be used in relay attacks.
So what is the way forward?
Most of the network authentication and modern operating systems make use of Kerberos as opposed to in
TLM version two.
Kerberos offers many advantages.
Keep in mind that it is not perfect.
However, it is still very difficult to disable Intel and version two entirely on the network.
And the reason for this is because Kerberos relies on service principal names.
For example, if you had to reference a server using its IP address instead of the DNC name, Kerberos
won't work and authentication will fall back to entirely version two.
And of course in network environments you would have all the devices such as printers, and these generally
do not support Kerberos and rely on Intel in version two or older variants of no Elm.